On 5 June 2026, the State Administration for Market Regulation of China (“SAMR”) issued the Annual Report on Antitrust Enforcement in China (2025) (“Report”). This is the seventh consecutive annual enforcement report published since the institutional reforms in 2019, and the third full year since the enforcement regime under the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (“AML”), amended in 2022, became comprehensively operative. The Report takes as its central thread the deep promotion of the construction of a unified national market and the comprehensive rectification of “involution-style” competition, and reveals, beyond the data, the strategic logic by which China embeds antitrust tools into macroeconomic governance, industrial security, and institutional opening-up.
Overview of the Report
The Report comprises a preface, a special feature, seven core chapters and appendices, systematically presenting the latest panorama of China’s competition policy and enforcement. Chapter 1 (Full-Year Work Review) outlines at a macro level the strategic orientation centered on building a “unified national market” and comprehensively rectifying “involution-style” competition, with regulatory emphasis placed directly on the pharmaceutical, public utility and internet platform economy sectors. The enforcement data in Chapter 2 (Regulatory Enforcement Results) further corroborate this regulatory intensity: a total of 706 concentrations of undertakings were concluded during the year; for the first time, a triple penalty mechanism targeting “enterprise + organizer + responsible individual” was pioneered in a case involving a horizontal monopoly agreement in the pharmaceutical sector; and, in accordance with the law, “look-through” regulation and regulatory interviews were launched against multinational technology giants and major internet platforms. This sends a clear signal to the international community that China’s antitrust enforcement is becoming stricter, more sophisticated, and aligned with high global standards.
For multinational enterprises, Chapter 3 (Rule of Law Development) and Chapter 4 (Implementation of Fair Competition Policy) offer regulatory guidance of great practical value. Chapter 3 reveals intensive moves to refine the antitrust legal framework, including the introduction of the Implementation Measures for the Fair Competition Review Regulation to strengthen the regulation of administrative monopolies, and the revision of the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements to clarify the applicable boundaries of the “safe harbor” regime. Moreover, the antitrust compliance guidelines issued for public utilities and internet platforms, together with the new rules on non-horizontal concentrations of undertakings, have significantly enhanced the legal predictability of foreign enterprises’ M&A and operations in China. Chapter 4 elaborates on the micro-level implementation of competition policy: enforcement agencies have conducted in-depth market competition assessments of frontier industries such as new energy vehicles and industrial robots and have vigorously promoted the implementation of the national standard Compliance Management Standards for Undertakings in Fair Competition, emphasizing ex ante risk prevention.
In terms of global outreach, Chapter 6 (International Exchange and Cooperation) highlights China’s open posture and pragmatic actions in deeply participating in global antitrust governance. China is actively incorporating competition chapters into bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and has deepened regular enforcement collaboration and information sharing with jurisdictions such as the European Union, BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the same time, Chinese agencies are also strengthening offshore antitrust compliance guidance and risk warnings for domestic enterprises going global.
Robust and Innovative Antitrust Enforcement
In 2025, a total of 20 monopoly cases were opened, with fines and confiscations totaling 653 million yuan (approximately US$96.38 million). Among these, 11 cases involved monopoly agreements, with fines and confiscations of RMB 606 million (approximately US$89.45 million); for the first time, personal liability was pursued against a natural person (Mr. Guo was fined RMB 500,000, equivalent to approximately US$73,800). Significant cases, including those concerning dexamethasone active pharmaceutical ingredients and neostigmine methylsulfate injection, were investigated, directly leading to a decline in drug prices. There were 11 abuse of dominance cases, with fines and confiscations of RMB 46.61 million (equivalent to approximately US$6.88 million), focusing on curbing exclusive dealing and the imposition of unreasonable conditions in public utility sectors such as water and gas supply. Through a public regulatory interview with Huolala, involution-style competition behaviors such as using algorithms to drive down freight rates and compelling “exclusive vehicle stickers” were corrected. In merger control, 706 concentrations of undertakings were concluded, with 687 unconditionally approved, five conditionally approved, and one prohibited (Wuhan Yongtong’s acquisition of Shandong Huatai in the pharmaceutical sector); four cases of illegal implementation of a concentration were publicly penalized. Enforcement against the abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition increased markedly, with 96 cases opened (a 34% increase over 2024) and 75 concluded (a 32% increase over 2024), focusing on eliminating local protection policies in areas such as public bidding and transportation, thereby demonstrating China’s legal resolve to further advance the construction of a unified national market.
In relation to antitrust enforcement with a foreign dimension, China’s practice in 2025 was distinctly characterized by an equal emphasis on high-level “look-through” regulation and safeguarding the security of global industrial chains. In merger review, China imposed restrictive conditions in accordance with the law on five major cross-border transactions, including Synopsys’ acquisition of Ansys, Bunge’s acquisition of Viterra, and All Nippon Airways’ acquisition of Nippon Cargo Airlines, and prudently handled cases such as CK Hutchison’s sale of overseas port assets, thereby effectively preserving the security of global industrial and supply chains in critical sectors including semiconductors, agricultural products, shipping and logistics, and key minerals.
China’s conduct regulation of multinational giants has become increasingly rigorous and proactive. Investigations were successively initiated against Google and DuPont China Co., Ltd. on suspicion of monopolistic conduct, and subsequently, for the first time, China publicly announced the suspension of the antitrust investigation into DuPont. Although details were not disclosed, this signals that China has acquired the capability to independently investigate multinational giants in the digital economy and materials science sectors. Building on the earlier conditional approval of NVIDIA’s acquisition of Mellanox, a further investigation was ordered due to suspected breach of commitments. This was the first time China initiated an investigation into a global AI chip leader for violating conditions attached to a decision. After Qualcomm completed its acquisition of Autotalks, a case was opened on suspicion of illegally implementing a concentration. China’s proactive intervention demonstrates that it no longer passively accepts the fait accompli of global M&A deals. Additionally, China actively provides systematic offshore antitrust compliance guidance and risk warnings to domestic enterprises that are “going global”.
The enforcement outcomes in 2025 show that China’s antitrust enforcement has deeply integrated industrial policy with competition policy. Domestically, the prohibition of Wuhan Yongtong’s acquisition of Shandong Huatai Pharmaceutical’s equity, with an order to “restore the pre-concentration status”, and the conditional approvals of concentrations in key minerals and semiconductors, clearly demonstrate that competition review has been entrusted with the strategic function of safeguarding industrial chain security and public welfare. Externally, when reviewing large global M&A transactions and regulating abuse of dominance, China closely intertwines domestic industrial security and supply chain autonomy with antitrust jurisprudence. The intensive investigations into multinational technology and chemical giants such as Google, DuPont, NVIDIA and Qualcomm indicate that China is actively participating in, and even taking the lead in, the governance of competition rules in the global digital economy and high-tech sectors.
Antitrust Regulations Evolving Towards Precision, Standardization and Transparency
In 2025, China intensively introduced or revised a series of regulatory instruments centered on four dimensions: concentration review, platform economy governance, public utility regulation, and vertical monopoly agreements. These include the Guidelines on the Review of Non-Horizontal Concentrations of Undertakings, the Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, the Benchmark for Discretionary Penalties for the Illegal Implementation of a Concentration of Undertakings (Trial), the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, the Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for Internet Platforms, and the Antitrust Guidelines for the Public Utility Sector.
With respect to cross-border M&A rules, the release of the Guidelines on the Review of Non-Horizontal Concentrations of Undertakings makes China a jurisdiction with review guidelines covering horizontal, vertical and conglomerate concentrations. The Guidelines establish market share screening thresholds — a party with a share exceeding 50% in an upstream, downstream or adjacent market is presumed to have exclusionary or restrictive effects on competition, a share between 25% and 35% requires focused analysis, and where all parties’ shares are below 25%, harm is presumed absent; introduce three theoretical frameworks of competitive harm: “input foreclosure”, “customer foreclosure” and “ecosystem foreclosure”; and, for the internet platform economy, clarify the analytical framework for novel behaviors such as self-preferencing and data blocking. This design reflects the integration of policy objectives such as industrial security and supply chain autonomy into competition analysis in the control of non-horizontal mergers, and a heightened alertness to “killer acquisitions” in vertical or conglomerate mergers.
Moreover, the concurrently issued Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings consolidates four previously dispersed notification guidance documents in the form of an industry standard, clarifying notification thresholds, materials and procedures. The Benchmark for Discretionary Penalties for the Illegal Implementation of a Concentration of Undertakings (Trial) codifies, in a normative document, the rules for the discretionary imposition of penalties for the illegal implementation of a concentration. For illegal concentrations that do not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, the Benchmark sets a base fine of RMB 2.5 million (equivalent to approximately US$ 369,000) and establishes tiered starting points for lenient and aggravated penalties. On this basis, it also sets out six downward adjustment factors and three upward adjustment factors, substantially enhancing the transparency and predictability of penalty outcomes.
In the area of monopoly conduct regulation, the revision of the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements elaborates on the substantive and procedural aspects of the “safe harbor”, ultimately activating the safe harbor regime for vertical monopoly agreements introduced by the 2022 AML amendment. The key revisions include: (1) clarifying the market share standards and conditions for the safe harbor: for conduct involving vertical price restraints, the market share of each party in the relevant market must be below 5%, with a turnover of less than RMB 100 million (equivalent to approximately US$ 14.76 million); for other vertical restraints, the parties’ market shares must be below 15%, with no turnover threshold; (2) clarifying the undertaking’s burden of proof and material requirements; and (3) clarifying the review procedure and legal consequences. This marks China’s adoption of a “third path” in the regulation of resale price maintenance (RPM) — distinct from the US trend towards a lenient rule of reason and the EU’s near per se illegality approach — seeking a balance between regulation and restraint through a very low-threshold safe harbor. However, given the extremely low 5% threshold, the practical applicability of this safe harbor may be limited.
In sector-specific areas, the Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for Internet Platforms directly address pain points in the digital economy, materializing novel monopoly risks in the form of eight risk examples: “algorithmic collusion”, “organizing or facilitating the conclusion of a monopoly agreement”, “unfairly high prices”, “below-cost sales”, “blocking and shielding”, “exclusive dealing”, “discriminatory treatment” and “most-favored-nation clauses”. The Guidelines expressly require platform operators to conduct rule reviews and algorithm screening, encourage the establishment of a chief compliance officer system and a closed-loop risk management mechanism, and create a “compliance incentive” provision — a platform that has established an effective antitrust compliance program may apply for lenient treatment during an investigation. The Antitrust Guidelines for the Public Utility Sector specifically target natural monopoly industries such as water, electricity, gas and heating supply, aiming to prevent the extension of monopoly advantages to upstream or downstream competitive segments (e.g., exclusive dealing, tying).
The array of new rules in 2025 clearly indicates that China’s antitrust regulations are moving from “rule establishment” towards precision, standardization and transparency. A distinctive feature of China’s rules lies in their greater emphasis on “ex ante prevention” rather than “ex post punishment” (fair competition review, compliance guidelines), a stronger focus on the “coordination of industrial policy and competition policy” (incorporating industrial chain security considerations into conditional approvals), and more concrete risk identification checklists.
Conclusion
What the 2025 Annual Report documents goes far beyond a column of figures. It sketches a national blueprint of a jurisdiction that is accelerating the construction of its own competition policy paradigm — using the fair competition review system to solidify the foundations, a refined body of rules to erect pillars and beams, “look-through” enforcement to demonstrate deterrence, and proactive extraterritorial jurisdiction to expand its domain. Domestically, antitrust has become a scalpel for removing blockages in the national economic cycle and curbing the chronic ailment of “involution”; externally, it is evolving into a strategic instrument for defending industrial security and engaging in the contest over global competition rules.
Overview of the Report
The Report comprises a preface, a special feature, seven core chapters and appendices, systematically presenting the latest panorama of China’s competition policy and enforcement. Chapter 1 (Full-Year Work Review) outlines at a macro level the strategic orientation centered on building a “unified national market” and comprehensively rectifying “involution-style” competition, with regulatory emphasis placed directly on the pharmaceutical, public utility and internet platform economy sectors. The enforcement data in Chapter 2 (Regulatory Enforcement Results) further corroborate this regulatory intensity: a total of 706 concentrations of undertakings were concluded during the year; for the first time, a triple penalty mechanism targeting “enterprise + organizer + responsible individual” was pioneered in a case involving a horizontal monopoly agreement in the pharmaceutical sector; and, in accordance with the law, “look-through” regulation and regulatory interviews were launched against multinational technology giants and major internet platforms. This sends a clear signal to the international community that China’s antitrust enforcement is becoming stricter, more sophisticated, and aligned with high global standards.
For multinational enterprises, Chapter 3 (Rule of Law Development) and Chapter 4 (Implementation of Fair Competition Policy) offer regulatory guidance of great practical value. Chapter 3 reveals intensive moves to refine the antitrust legal framework, including the introduction of the Implementation Measures for the Fair Competition Review Regulation to strengthen the regulation of administrative monopolies, and the revision of the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements to clarify the applicable boundaries of the “safe harbor” regime. Moreover, the antitrust compliance guidelines issued for public utilities and internet platforms, together with the new rules on non-horizontal concentrations of undertakings, have significantly enhanced the legal predictability of foreign enterprises’ M&A and operations in China. Chapter 4 elaborates on the micro-level implementation of competition policy: enforcement agencies have conducted in-depth market competition assessments of frontier industries such as new energy vehicles and industrial robots and have vigorously promoted the implementation of the national standard Compliance Management Standards for Undertakings in Fair Competition, emphasizing ex ante risk prevention.
In terms of global outreach, Chapter 6 (International Exchange and Cooperation) highlights China’s open posture and pragmatic actions in deeply participating in global antitrust governance. China is actively incorporating competition chapters into bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and has deepened regular enforcement collaboration and information sharing with jurisdictions such as the European Union, BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the same time, Chinese agencies are also strengthening offshore antitrust compliance guidance and risk warnings for domestic enterprises going global.
Robust and Innovative Antitrust Enforcement
In 2025, a total of 20 monopoly cases were opened, with fines and confiscations totaling 653 million yuan (approximately US$96.38 million). Among these, 11 cases involved monopoly agreements, with fines and confiscations of RMB 606 million (approximately US$89.45 million); for the first time, personal liability was pursued against a natural person (Mr. Guo was fined RMB 500,000, equivalent to approximately US$73,800). Significant cases, including those concerning dexamethasone active pharmaceutical ingredients and neostigmine methylsulfate injection, were investigated, directly leading to a decline in drug prices. There were 11 abuse of dominance cases, with fines and confiscations of RMB 46.61 million (equivalent to approximately US$6.88 million), focusing on curbing exclusive dealing and the imposition of unreasonable conditions in public utility sectors such as water and gas supply. Through a public regulatory interview with Huolala, involution-style competition behaviors such as using algorithms to drive down freight rates and compelling “exclusive vehicle stickers” were corrected. In merger control, 706 concentrations of undertakings were concluded, with 687 unconditionally approved, five conditionally approved, and one prohibited (Wuhan Yongtong’s acquisition of Shandong Huatai in the pharmaceutical sector); four cases of illegal implementation of a concentration were publicly penalized. Enforcement against the abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition increased markedly, with 96 cases opened (a 34% increase over 2024) and 75 concluded (a 32% increase over 2024), focusing on eliminating local protection policies in areas such as public bidding and transportation, thereby demonstrating China’s legal resolve to further advance the construction of a unified national market.
In relation to antitrust enforcement with a foreign dimension, China’s practice in 2025 was distinctly characterized by an equal emphasis on high-level “look-through” regulation and safeguarding the security of global industrial chains. In merger review, China imposed restrictive conditions in accordance with the law on five major cross-border transactions, including Synopsys’ acquisition of Ansys, Bunge’s acquisition of Viterra, and All Nippon Airways’ acquisition of Nippon Cargo Airlines, and prudently handled cases such as CK Hutchison’s sale of overseas port assets, thereby effectively preserving the security of global industrial and supply chains in critical sectors including semiconductors, agricultural products, shipping and logistics, and key minerals.
China’s conduct regulation of multinational giants has become increasingly rigorous and proactive. Investigations were successively initiated against Google and DuPont China Co., Ltd. on suspicion of monopolistic conduct, and subsequently, for the first time, China publicly announced the suspension of the antitrust investigation into DuPont. Although details were not disclosed, this signals that China has acquired the capability to independently investigate multinational giants in the digital economy and materials science sectors. Building on the earlier conditional approval of NVIDIA’s acquisition of Mellanox, a further investigation was ordered due to suspected breach of commitments. This was the first time China initiated an investigation into a global AI chip leader for violating conditions attached to a decision. After Qualcomm completed its acquisition of Autotalks, a case was opened on suspicion of illegally implementing a concentration. China’s proactive intervention demonstrates that it no longer passively accepts the fait accompli of global M&A deals. Additionally, China actively provides systematic offshore antitrust compliance guidance and risk warnings to domestic enterprises that are “going global”.
The enforcement outcomes in 2025 show that China’s antitrust enforcement has deeply integrated industrial policy with competition policy. Domestically, the prohibition of Wuhan Yongtong’s acquisition of Shandong Huatai Pharmaceutical’s equity, with an order to “restore the pre-concentration status”, and the conditional approvals of concentrations in key minerals and semiconductors, clearly demonstrate that competition review has been entrusted with the strategic function of safeguarding industrial chain security and public welfare. Externally, when reviewing large global M&A transactions and regulating abuse of dominance, China closely intertwines domestic industrial security and supply chain autonomy with antitrust jurisprudence. The intensive investigations into multinational technology and chemical giants such as Google, DuPont, NVIDIA and Qualcomm indicate that China is actively participating in, and even taking the lead in, the governance of competition rules in the global digital economy and high-tech sectors.
Antitrust Regulations Evolving Towards Precision, Standardization and Transparency
In 2025, China intensively introduced or revised a series of regulatory instruments centered on four dimensions: concentration review, platform economy governance, public utility regulation, and vertical monopoly agreements. These include the Guidelines on the Review of Non-Horizontal Concentrations of Undertakings, the Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, the Benchmark for Discretionary Penalties for the Illegal Implementation of a Concentration of Undertakings (Trial), the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, the Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for Internet Platforms, and the Antitrust Guidelines for the Public Utility Sector.
With respect to cross-border M&A rules, the release of the Guidelines on the Review of Non-Horizontal Concentrations of Undertakings makes China a jurisdiction with review guidelines covering horizontal, vertical and conglomerate concentrations. The Guidelines establish market share screening thresholds — a party with a share exceeding 50% in an upstream, downstream or adjacent market is presumed to have exclusionary or restrictive effects on competition, a share between 25% and 35% requires focused analysis, and where all parties’ shares are below 25%, harm is presumed absent; introduce three theoretical frameworks of competitive harm: “input foreclosure”, “customer foreclosure” and “ecosystem foreclosure”; and, for the internet platform economy, clarify the analytical framework for novel behaviors such as self-preferencing and data blocking. This design reflects the integration of policy objectives such as industrial security and supply chain autonomy into competition analysis in the control of non-horizontal mergers, and a heightened alertness to “killer acquisitions” in vertical or conglomerate mergers.
Moreover, the concurrently issued Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings consolidates four previously dispersed notification guidance documents in the form of an industry standard, clarifying notification thresholds, materials and procedures. The Benchmark for Discretionary Penalties for the Illegal Implementation of a Concentration of Undertakings (Trial) codifies, in a normative document, the rules for the discretionary imposition of penalties for the illegal implementation of a concentration. For illegal concentrations that do not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, the Benchmark sets a base fine of RMB 2.5 million (equivalent to approximately US$ 369,000) and establishes tiered starting points for lenient and aggravated penalties. On this basis, it also sets out six downward adjustment factors and three upward adjustment factors, substantially enhancing the transparency and predictability of penalty outcomes.
In the area of monopoly conduct regulation, the revision of the Provisions on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements elaborates on the substantive and procedural aspects of the “safe harbor”, ultimately activating the safe harbor regime for vertical monopoly agreements introduced by the 2022 AML amendment. The key revisions include: (1) clarifying the market share standards and conditions for the safe harbor: for conduct involving vertical price restraints, the market share of each party in the relevant market must be below 5%, with a turnover of less than RMB 100 million (equivalent to approximately US$ 14.76 million); for other vertical restraints, the parties’ market shares must be below 15%, with no turnover threshold; (2) clarifying the undertaking’s burden of proof and material requirements; and (3) clarifying the review procedure and legal consequences. This marks China’s adoption of a “third path” in the regulation of resale price maintenance (RPM) — distinct from the US trend towards a lenient rule of reason and the EU’s near per se illegality approach — seeking a balance between regulation and restraint through a very low-threshold safe harbor. However, given the extremely low 5% threshold, the practical applicability of this safe harbor may be limited.
In sector-specific areas, the Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for Internet Platforms directly address pain points in the digital economy, materializing novel monopoly risks in the form of eight risk examples: “algorithmic collusion”, “organizing or facilitating the conclusion of a monopoly agreement”, “unfairly high prices”, “below-cost sales”, “blocking and shielding”, “exclusive dealing”, “discriminatory treatment” and “most-favored-nation clauses”. The Guidelines expressly require platform operators to conduct rule reviews and algorithm screening, encourage the establishment of a chief compliance officer system and a closed-loop risk management mechanism, and create a “compliance incentive” provision — a platform that has established an effective antitrust compliance program may apply for lenient treatment during an investigation. The Antitrust Guidelines for the Public Utility Sector specifically target natural monopoly industries such as water, electricity, gas and heating supply, aiming to prevent the extension of monopoly advantages to upstream or downstream competitive segments (e.g., exclusive dealing, tying).
The array of new rules in 2025 clearly indicates that China’s antitrust regulations are moving from “rule establishment” towards precision, standardization and transparency. A distinctive feature of China’s rules lies in their greater emphasis on “ex ante prevention” rather than “ex post punishment” (fair competition review, compliance guidelines), a stronger focus on the “coordination of industrial policy and competition policy” (incorporating industrial chain security considerations into conditional approvals), and more concrete risk identification checklists.
Conclusion
What the 2025 Annual Report documents goes far beyond a column of figures. It sketches a national blueprint of a jurisdiction that is accelerating the construction of its own competition policy paradigm — using the fair competition review system to solidify the foundations, a refined body of rules to erect pillars and beams, “look-through” enforcement to demonstrate deterrence, and proactive extraterritorial jurisdiction to expand its domain. Domestically, antitrust has become a scalpel for removing blockages in the national economic cycle and curbing the chronic ailment of “involution”; externally, it is evolving into a strategic instrument for defending industrial security and engaging in the contest over global competition rules.