China’s Supreme People's Court Clarifies Domain Names Can Be Protected as Prior Rights Under the Trademark Law
Published 13 January 2026
Fei Dang
On December 18, 2025, the official WeChat account of the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court published a judgment of an “Administrative Dispute Case Concerning the Request for Invalidation of Trademark Rights: Hangzhou * Technology Co., Ltd. v. the China National Intellectual Property Administration and the Others” [(2024) Zui Gao Fa Xing Za No. 244]. The case holds significant importance as it clarifies that under specific conditions a domain name may also qualify as prior civil rights under Article 32 of the Trademark Law and thus be protected.
Case Introduction
The trademark No. 39744963 “DataFocus” (the disputed trademark) at issue was applied for registration with the CNIPA by a software company (the original trademark applicant”) on July 18, 2019, and was approved for registration on May 14, 2020, in relation to services in Class 42 including computer programming, computer software design, and so on. On August 6, 2020, the disputed trademark was assigned to a joint-stock company in Zhejiang (“the Joint-Stock Company”).
The petitioner for the retrial (i.e., the plaintiff of the first instance court, the appellant of the second instance court), a technology company in Hangzhou (“the Technology Company”), is the authorized user and/or registrant of domain names including “datafocus.ai” and “datafocus.io.” Among them, the domain name “datafocus.ai” was registered on July 5, 2017, by an individual named Wang, the legal representative of the Technology Company, who authorized the Technology Company to use this domain name. On July 31, 2020, the Technology Company filed a request for invalidation of the disputed trademark based on the following grounds: I. The original trademark applicant had no intention to use the disputed trademark. The registration of the disputed trademark was deceptive and obtained through improper means, likely to cause adverse effects. 2. The registration of the disputed trademark infringed upon the Technology Company's prior domain name rights, computer software copyrights, and other rights. 3. The original trademark applicant maliciously squatted on a trademark that the Technology Company had used prior to the application and that had gained a certain degree of influence.
Upon examination, the CNIPA considered that the evidence submitted by the Technology Company “only proves that the domain name websites 'datafocus.io,' 'datafocus.ai,' 'datafocus.org,' and 'datafocus.cn' have been registered, but it is difficult to prove that such domain names had gained significant influence among the relevant public through prior use before the disputed trademark was applied for. It is therefore difficult to conclude that the registration and use of the disputed trademark would lead the relevant public to associate it with the applicant's domain names, thereby causing confusion regarding the source of services. Consequently, the application for registration of the disputed trademark does not constitute infringement of the applicant's prior domain name rights. ... The evidence submitted was either self-generated or of weak probative value, insufficient to prove that prior to the disputed trademark application, the applicant had used a trademark identical or similar to the disputed trademark on identical or similar services such as computer programming and computer software design and had gained a certain degree of influence. Therefore, the registration of the disputed trademark does not violate Article 32 of the Trademark Law, which states that 'no person shall, by improper means, register in advance a trademark that has been used by another and has gained a certain degree of influence.' Furthermore, the Technology Company's claim that the disputed trademark violated Articles 10.1.7 and 10.1.8 and Article 44.1 of the Trademark Law was also rejected. In short, the CNIPA issued a decision maintaining the registration of the disputed trademark, which was also subsequently maintained by the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (the “First-Instance Court”) and the Beijing Higher People's Court (the “Second-Instance Court”).
Due to dissatisfaction with the judgment that maintained the registration of the registered trademark by the Second-Instance Court, the Technology Company applied for a retrial to the Supreme People's Court based on the following grounds: “(1) Its registered domain name has gained a certain influence among the relevant public through use. The registration of the disputed trademark constitutes the circumstance of 'infringing upon another party's existing prior rights' provided in Article 32 of the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (the Trademark Law). (2) The 'DataFoucs' mark was created by the Technology Company and has gained a certain degree of influence through use in Class 42 services. The application for registration of the disputed trademark has constituted the “unfairly preempting the registration of a trademark that has been used by another party and has gained a certain degree of influence” provided in Article 32 of the Trademark Law. (3) The original applicant of the disputed trademark had no intention of using the disputed trademark, and its application for registration violates the provisions of Article 4 of the Trademark Law.” In a word, the Technology Company requested to revoke the First-Instance and the Second-Instance Judgments, as well as the Appealed Decision, and ordered the CNIPA to reissue the decision and bear the litigation fee.
The CNIPA expressed that it agreed with the First-Instance and the Second-Instance Judgments. The owner of the disputed trademark, the Joint-Stock Company, did not only claim that a domain name registration does not constitute a prior right within the trademark field and thus does not constitute a case of “infringing upon another party's existing prior rights,” but also denied that the registration of the disputed trademark had violated the provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that have been used by others and have gained a certain degree of influence through improper means, nor had it violated the provisions of Article 4 of the Trademark Law.Upon retrial examination, the Supreme People's Court found that, prior to the application date of the disputed trademark: 1) Approximately 600 individuals (including technical personnel from Shenzhen Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and China Mobile) have registered on the website “www.datafocus.ai,” which had published multiple articles, including those with “DataFocus” in their titles; 2) the Technology Company also published various articles and/or videos under accounts bearing its company name or “DataFocus” on different websites, including but not limited to Xigua Video, Sohu, Baidu Baijiahao, Sina Finance, WeChat Official Accounts, and NetEase; 3) the Phoenix News had published over 50 articles mentioning DataFocus. Additionally, searches using “datafocus” as a keyword on search engines like Baidu, Sogou, 360, and Bing consistently yield results related to the Technology Company's “datafocus,” with multiple entries coming from the Technology Company’s website at www.datafocus.ai.
Court Judgment
The Supreme People's Court summarized the key issues in the retrial phase of this case as whether the registration of the disputed trademark violated the provisions of Articles 32 and 4 of the Trademark Law and further divided the issues concerning Article 32 into two parts for discussion.
(i) Whether the registration of the disputed trademark violated others’ prior rights
The Supreme People's Court considered that in terms of time, the “prior rights” provided in Article 32 of the Trademark Law must have been enjoyed prior to the application date of the disputed trademark and must still exist at the time of the disputed trademark's registration approval. In terms of scope, the “prior rights” encompass both “civil rights” and “other legitimate interests deserving protection.” Therefore, the civil rights lawfully enjoyed by the parties prior to the application date of the disputed trademark shall be protected. According to judicial interpretations such as the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes Over Domain Names of Computer Network, and the Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court of Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, domain names also constitute a type of legally protected civil right. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has stated that when a domain name is registered prior to the application date of a disputed trademark, it may be protected as a prior civil right under Article 32 of the Trademark Law.Furthermore, the Supreme Court further summarized the conditions for domain names to obtain trademark protection as prior rights: “Firstly, the domain name must have been registered prior to the application date of the disputed trademark; secondly, the domain name must possess a certain degree of fame; thirdly, the domain name and the disputed trademark must be identical or similar; fourthly, the goods or services for which the domain name has gained influence must be similar to those for which the disputed trademark is registered, thereby likely causing confusion among the relevant public.” In this case, the Supreme Court established that prior to the disputed trademark's application date, the legal representative of the Technology Company had registered the domain name “datafocus.ai” and authorized the company to use it. The primary portion of this domain name is identical to the English letters of the disputed trademark. The website linked to this domain name featured content related to data analysis and software applications, which shares connections with the designated services of the disputed trademark (such as computer programming and computer software design) in terms of purpose, content, and target audience, constituting similar services. Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that evidence submitted by the Technology Company during the litigation demonstrated that through extensive promotion and use, the “datafocus.ai” domain name had acquired a certain level of fame prior to the filing date of the disputed trademark. In summary, the Supreme Court held that the registration of the disputed trademark infringed upon the prior domain name rights of the Technology Company.Whether the registration of the disputed trademark constituted rush-registering other’s trademark that had been used with certain influence by unfair means
The Supreme Court considered that the application of this provision requires the simultaneous fulfillment of the following four conditions: “Firstly, the unregistered trademark must have been used prior to the application date of the disputed trademark and have gained a certain degree of influence; secondly, the disputed trademark and the prior-used unregistered trademark must constitute identical or similar trademarks; thirdly, the goods designated for use with the disputed trademark must be identical or similar to the goods used with the prior-used unregistered trademark; fourthly, the applicant of the disputed trademark must have known or should have known of the prior use of the trademark by another party.” The Supreme Court further clarified that the concept of “unfair means” essentially refers to the trademark applicant's malicious intent to appropriate the goodwill associated with another party's prior use of the trademark.In this case, the Supreme Court considered that 1) the evidence submitted by the Technology Company had sufficiently demonstrated that prior to the application date of the disputed trademark, it had already used the “DataFocus” trademark in connection with data analysis and software application services, achieving a certain level of fame and influence. 2) The disputed trademark “DataFocus” shares the identical English element “DataFocus” with the Technology Company's prior-used trademark, and the services covered by both trademarks are identical or have a certain relation in terms of purpose, content, and target audience, constituting similar services. 3) The Technology Company's prior trademark “DataFocus” had gained a certain level of recognition through promotion and use. As an operator in the same industry providing computer software services, the original applicant of the disputed trademark “had known or should have known of the existence of this trademark, failed to reasonably avoid it and still registered the identical disputed trademark for identical or similar services. Subjectively, this is difficult to justify as legitimate, and objectively, it is likely to cause confusion among the relevant public.” Therefore, the registration of the disputed trademark has constituted the rush-registration of another party's trademark that has been used and gained a certain degree of influence by unfair means."
In a word, the Supreme Court considered that the Technology Company’s retrial claim that the registration of the disputed trademark had violated Article 32 of the Trademark Law was established.
(ii) Whether the registration of the disputed trademark violated Article 4 of the Trademark Law
The Supreme Court considered that since the existing evidence failed to prove that the original trademark applicant of the disputed trademark engaged in large-scale trademark hoarding without intent to use for profit, and the Technology Company also acknowledged that the original applicant did not mass-register software trademarks, the registration of the disputed trademark does not constitute a violation of Article 4 of the Trademark Law. Therefore, the Supreme Court rejected the Technology Company's claim in its retrial petition that the registration of the disputed trademark violated Article 4 of the Trademark Law.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court recognized that the First-Instance and Second-Instance Judgments, as well as the Appealed Decision, erroneously determined that the registration of the disputed trademark did not violate Article 32 of the Trademark Law, thereby misapplying the law. The Technology Company's grounds for requesting a retrial on this matter are valid. The Supreme People's Court supported this request and hereby ordered to:
1. Revoke the Administrative Judgment (2023) Jing Xing Zhong No. 3987 of the Beijing Higher People's Court;2. Revoke the Administrative Judgment (2021) Jing 73 Xing Chu No. 7495 of the Beijing IP Court;3. Revoke the China National Intellectual Property Administration's Decision on the Invalidation of Trademark No. 39744963 “DataFocus” (Shang Ping Zi [2021] No. 79496);4. Re-issued a new decision on the trademark No. 39744963 “DataFocus” by the China National Intellectual Property Administration.
This judgment is final.
Case Comment
As a judgment incorporated in the 11th issue of the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court for 2025, this case primarily addresses whether a domain name can be protected as a prior right under Article 32 of the Trademark Law.
According to the key points of the ruling in this case, for a domain name to qualify as a prior civil right protected under Article 32 of the Trademark Law, the following conditions must be met: "(1) The domain name was registered prior to the application date of the disputed trademark application; (2) The domain name enjoys a certain degree of fame and is known to the relevant public; (3) The domain name is identical or similar to the disputed trademark; (4) The goods or services provided by the domain name operator are identical or similar to those for which the disputed trademark is registered and are likely to cause confusion among the relevant public. The evidence of promotion and use of the domain name operator's goods or services may serve as a factual basis for determining whether the domain name enjoys a certain degree of fame."
Article 32 of the Trademark Law provides that “An application for the registration of a trademark shall not create any prejudice to the prior right of another person, nor shall unfair means be used to preemptively register the trademark of some reputation another person has used.” Regarding the scope of the said prior rights, the CNIPA enumerates several specific prior rights in its Trademark Examination and Review Guidelines formulated and issued in 2021, which include trade name rights, copyrights, design patent rights, name rights, portrait rights, geographical indications, names, packaging, and decoration of goods or services with a certain reputation, rights to work titles, and rights to character names within works. It should be noted that this enumeration is not exhaustive but open-ended. That is, the prior rights under Article 32 of the Trademark Law are not limited to the civil rights listed above. Any legally protected civil rights that existed and were valid prior to the application date of the disputed trademark application may fall within the scope of protection under this provision.In this case, the Supreme Court first confirmed that domain names constitute civil rights protected by law by citing relevant judicial interpretations (such as Article 4 of Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Application of Laws in the Trial of Civil Disputes Over Domain Names of Computer Network) and then specified the concrete conditions under which prior domain name rights are protected under Article 32 of the Trademark Law. Thus, this case not only established the legal framework and specific requirements for domain names to obtain trademark law protection as prior civil rights—providing crucial guidance for future similar cases—but also demonstrated the Supreme People's Court's firm stance against malicious trademark squatting. This upholds the principle of honesty and credit and safeguards fair competition in the market order.